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Abstract
After a Human-Level AI-oriented overview of the status quo in neural-symbolic
integration, two research programs aiming at overcoming long-standing chal-
lenges in the field are suggested to the community: The first program targets a
better understanding of foundational differences and relationships on the level of
computational complexity between symbolic and subsymbolic computation and
representation, potentially providing explanations for the empirical differences
between the paradigms in application scenarios and a foothold for subsequent at-
tempts at overcoming these. The second program suggests a new approach and
computational architecture for the cognitively-inspired anchoring of an agent’s
learning, knowledge formation, and higher reasoning abilities in real-world inter-
actions through a closed neural-symbolic acting/sensing–processing–reasoning
cycle, potentially providing new foundations for future agent architectures,
multi-agent systems, robotics, and cognitive systems and facilitating a deeper
understanding of the development and interaction in human-technological set-
tings.
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1. A Tale of Symbols and Signals: The Quest for Neural-Symbolic
Integration
“I repeat my belief that learning has to be at the center of the arti-
ficial intelligence enterprise. While I do not regard intelligence as
a unitary phenomenon, I do believe that the problem of reasoning5
from learned data is a central aspect of it.” (Leslie Valiant, Valiant
(2013), p. 163)
A seamless coupling between learning and reasoning is commonly taken as
basis for intelligence in humans and, in close analogy, also for the biologically-
inspired (re-)creation of human-level intelligence with computational means.10
Still, one of the unsolved methodological core issues in human-level AI, cog-
nitive systems modelling, and cognitive and computational neuroscience—and
as such one of the major obstacles towards solving the Biologically Inspired
Cognitive Architectures (BICA) challenge (Samsonovich (2012))—is the ques-
tion for the integration between connectionist subsymbolic (i.e., “neural-level”)15
and logic-based symbolic (i.e., “cognitive-level”) approaches to representation,
computation, (mostly subsymbolic) learning, and (mostly symbolic) higher-level
reasoning.
AI researchers working on the modelling or (re-)creation of human cognition
and intelligence, and cognitive neuroscientists trying to understand the neu-20
ral basis for human cognition, have for years been interested in the nature of
brain-computation in general (see, e.g., Adolphs (2015)) and the relation be-
tween subsymbolic/neural and symbolic/cognitive modes of representation and
computation in particular (see, e.g., Dinsmore (1992)). The brain has a neu-
ral structure which operates on the basis of low-level processing of perceptual25
signals, but cognition also exhibits the capability to efficiently perform abstract
reasoning and symbol processing; in fact, processes of the latter type seem
to form the conceptual cornerstones for thinking, decision-making, and other
(also directly behavior-relevant) mental activities (see, e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn
(1988)).30
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Building on these observations—and taking into account that hybrid sys-
tems loosely combining symbolic and subsymbolic modules into one architecture
turned out to be insufficient for the purpose—agreement on the need for fully
integrated neural-cognitive processing has emerged (see, e.g., Bader & Hitzler
(2005); d’Avila Garcez et al. (2015)). This has several reasons also beyond the35
analogy to the described functioning principles of the brain:
• In general, network-based approaches possess a higher degree of biological
motivation than symbol-based approaches, also outmatching the latter in
terms of learning capacities, robust fault-tolerant processing, and general-
ization to similar input. Also, in AI applications they often enable flexible40
tools (e.g., for discovering and processing the internal structure of possibly
large data sets) and efficient signal-processing models (which are biologi-
cally plausible and optimally suited for a wide range of applications).
• Symbolic representations are generally superior in terms of their inter-
pretability, the possibilities of direct control and coding, and the extraction45
of knowledge when compared to their (in many ways still black box-like)
connectionist counterparts.1
• From a cognitive modelling point of view, subsymbolic representations for
tasks requiring symbolic high-level reasoning might help solving, among
many others, the problem with “too large” logical (epistemic) models (see,50
e.g., Gierasimczuk & Szymanik (2011)) which seem to lead to implausible
computations from the reasoning agent’s perspective (Degremont et al.
1Based on results as, for instance, the ones presented in Olden & Jackson (2002), it has
been argued that the inner mechanics of artificial neural networks (ANNs) can be made
accessible using randomization methods and similar. While this is true when seeing ANNs
as quantitative tools or means of statistical modelling, from the quite different perspective of
mechanistic or explanatory knowledge about principles, rules, and processes within ANNs as
part of cognitive architectures the black box character remains (with rule extraction methods,
as, e.g., proposed in Andrews et al. (1995), d’Avila Garcez et al. (2001), or Zhou et al. (2003),
mitigating the problem only to a minimal degree).
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(2014)). On the other hand, being able to lift subsymbolic brain-inspired
models and corresponding simulations to a symbolic level of description
and analysis promises to close the interpretative and explanatory gap be-55
tween actual biologically-motivated model dynamics and observed behav-
ior also for tasks involving complex or abstract reasoning.
In summary, cognitive-level interpretations of artificial neural network (ANN)
architectures and accurate and feasible neural-level models of symbolic process-
ing are highly desirable: as an important step towards the computational (re-60
)creation of mental capacities, as possible sources of an additional (bridging)
level of explanation of cognitive phenomena of the human brain (assuming that
suitably chosen ANN models correspond in a meaningful way to their biological
counterparts), and also as important part of future technological developments
(also see Sect. 6).65
But while there is theoretical evidence indicating that both paradigms in-
deed share deep connections, how to explicitly establish and exploit these cor-
respondences currently remains a mostly unsolved question. In the following,
after a concise overview of the state of the art in the field of neural-symbolic
integration in Sect. 2, as an invitation to researchers from the relevant com-70
munities two research programs are laid out which have the potential to shed
light on this foundational issue: The first one, summarized in Sect. 3, targets
a better understanding of the empirical differences and commonalities between
formalisms from the symbolic and the subsymbolic paradigm on the level of
computational complexity in more scenario-specific and fine-grained ways than75
previously achieved. The second one, outlined in Sect. 4, gives a conceptual
sketch of a research effort developing a new approach and computational ar-
chitecture for the cognitively-inspired anchoring of an agent’s learning, knowl-
edge formation, and higher reasoning abilities in real-world interactions through
a closed neural-symbolic acting/sensing–processing–reasoning cycle. If imple-80
mented successfully, the second program will lay the foundations for a new
generation of intelligent agent systems, also giving evidence of the capacities of
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fully integrated neural-symbolic learning and reasoning on system level. Thus,
as explained in Sect. 5, when taken together both programs—besides signif-
icantly advancing the field of neural-symbolic integration—promise to greatly85
contribute to all four pillars and the respectively associated main scientific views
of BICA identified in Stocco et al. (2010). Additionally, major impact of the
research programs (and the corresponding form of neural-symbolic integration)
can also be expected on an immediate technological level in the area of smart
systems. Sect. 6 sketches the corresponding technological scenario and describes90
an envisioned example from the domain of ambient-assisted living (AAL).
2. Status Quo in Neural-Symbolic Integration as of 2015
Concerning our current understanding of the relationship and differences be-
tween symbolic and subsymbolic computation and representation, the cognitive-
level “symbolic paradigm” is commonly taken to correspond to a Von Neumann95
architecture (with predominantly discrete and serial computation and localized
representations) and the neural-level “subsymbolic paradigm” mainly is concep-
tualized as a dynamical systems-type approach (with distributed representations
and predominantly parallel and continuous computations).
This divergence notwithstanding, both symbolic/cognitive and subsymbolic/neural100
models in theory are considered substantially equivalent in most (if not all)
practically relevant dimensions (see Sect. 2.1 for details). Still, in general expe-
riences from application studies consistently and reliably show different degrees
of suitability and performance of the paradigms in different types of application
scenarios, with subsymbolic approaches offering themselves, e.g., for effective105
and efficient solutions to tasks involving learning and generalization, while high-
level reasoning and concept composition are commonly addressed in symbolic
frameworks. Unfortunately, general explanations (and solutions) for this foun-
dational dichotomy this far have been elusive when using standard methods of
investigation.110
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Figure 1: A schematic overview of common conceptualizations concerning symbolic and sub-
symbolic representation and computation, as well as the connections and differences between
both paradigms (see Sect. 2.1 for details concerning the indicated formal equivalences).
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2.1. Formal Analysis of Symbolic and Subsymbolic Computation and Represen-
tation
According to our current knowledge, from a formal perspective—especially
when focusing on actually physically-realizable and implementable systems (i.e.,
physical finite state machines) instead of strictly abstract models of compu-115
tation, together with the resulting physical and conceptual limitations—both
symbolic/cognitive and subsymbolic/neural models seem basically equivalent.
Notwithstanding partially differing theoretical findings and discussions (as,
e.g., given in Tabor (2009)), both paradigms are considered computability-
equivalent in practice (Siegelmann (1999)). Also from a tractability perspec-120
tive, for instance in van Rooij (2008), equivalence in practice with respect to
classical dimensions of analysis (i.e., interchangeability except for a polynomial
overhead) has been established, complementing and supporting the theoreti-
cal suggestion of equivalence by Van Emde Boas in his Invariance Thesis (van
Emde Boas (1990)) . Finally, Leitgeb provided an in principle existence result125
in Leitgeb (2005), showing that there is no substantial difference in represen-
tational or problem-solving power between dynamical systems with distributed
representations or symbolic systems with non-monotonic reasoning capabilities.
Still, these results are only partially satisfactory: Although introducing basic
connections and mutual dependencies between both paradigms, the respective130
levels of analysis are quite coarse and the found results are only existential in
character. While establishing the in principle equivalence described above, in
Leitgeb (2005) no constructive methods for how to actually obtain the corre-
sponding symbolic counterpart to a subsymbolic model (and vice versa) are
given.135
Concerning the complexity and computability equivalences, while the latter
is supported by the results in Leitgeb (2005), the former stays mostly untouched:
While coming to the same conclusion, i.e., the absence of substantial differences
between paradigms (i.e., differences at the level of tractability classes), no fur-
ther clarification or characterization of the precise nature and properties of the140
polynomial overhead between symbolic and subsymbolic approaches is provided.
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2.2. Neural-Symbolic Integration in AI, Cognitive Modelling, and Machine Learn-
ing
Research on integrated neural-symbolic systems (especially in AI and to a
certain extent also in cognitive modelling) has made significant progress over145
the last two decades (see, e.g., Bader & Hitzler (2005); d’Avila Garcez et al.
(2015)); partially, but not exclusively, in the wake of the development of deep
learning approaches to machine learning (see, e.g. Bengio et al. (2013); Schmid-
huber (2015)). Generally, what seem to be several important steps towards the
development of integrated neural-symbolic models have been made:150
• From the symbolic perspective on the capacities of subsymbolic computa-
tion and representation, the “Propositional Fixation” (i.e., the limitation
of neural models on implementing propositional logic at best) has been
overcome, among others, in models implementing modal or temporal log-
ics with ANNs (see, e.g., d’Avila Garcez et al. (2008)).155
• From the subsymbolic perspective, neural computation has been equipped
with features previously (almost) exclusively limited to symbolic models
by adding top-down governing mechanisms to modular, neural learning ar-
chitectures, for example, through the use of “Conceptors” (Jaeger (2014))
as computational principle.160
• Deep learning approaches to machine learning—by the high number of
parameterized transformations performed in the corresponding hierarchi-
cally structured models—seem to, at first sight, also conceptually provide
what can be interpreted as different levels of abstraction above and beyond
mere low-level processing. The resulting networks partially perform tasks165
classically involving complex symbolic reasoning such as, for instance, the
labeling of picture elements or scene description (see, e.g., Karpathy &
Fei-Fei (2014); Vinyals et al. (2014)).
• Recently proposed classes of subsymbolic models such as “Neural Turing
Machines” (Graves et al. (2014)) or “Memory Networks” (Weston et al.170
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(2015)) seem to also architecturally narrow the gap between the (subsym-
bolic) dynamical systems characterization and the (symbolic) Von Neu-
mann architecture understanding.
Nonetheless, all these developments (including deep neural networks as lay-
ered recurrent ANNs) stay within the possibilities and limitations of the respec-175
tive classical paradigms without significantly changing the basic formal charac-
teristics of the latter.
2.3. Summary
Although remarkable successes have been achieved within the respective
paradigms, the divide between the paradigms persists, interconnecting results180
still either only address specific and non-generalizable cases or are in principle
and non-constructive, benchmark scenarios for principled comparisons (e.g., in
terms of expressive strength of knowledge representation formalisms or descrip-
tive complexity) between subsymbolic and symbolic models have still not been
established, and questions concerning the precise nature of the relationship and185
foundational differences between symbolic/cognitive and subsymbolic/neural
approaches to computation and representation still remain unanswered (see,
e.g., Isaac et al. (2014)): in some cases due to a lack of knowledge for deciding
the problem, in others due to a lack of tools and methods for properly specifying
and addressing the relevant questions.190
3. Identifying and Exploring Differences in Complexity
Focusing on the just described lack of tools and methods, together with the
insufficient theoretical knowledge about many aspects of the respective form(s)
of computation and representation, in the first of the two envisioned research
programs (initially introduced in Besold (2015)), the classical findings concern-195
ing the relation and integration between the symbolic/cognitive and the sub-
symbolic/neural paradigm described in Sect. 2 shall be revisited in light of new
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developments in the modelling and analysis of connectionist systems in gen-
eral (and ANNs in particular), and of new formal methods for investigating the
properties of general forms of representation and computation on a symbolic200
level.
To this end, taking into account the apparent empirical differences between
the paradigms and (especially when dealing with physically-realizable systems)
assuming basic equivalence on the level of computability, emphasis shall be put
on identifying and/or developing adequate formal tools and investigating pre-205
viously unconsidered aspects of existing equivalence results. Focus shall be put
on the precise nature of the polynomial overhead as computational-complexity
difference between paradigms: Most complexity results for symbolic/cognitive
and subsymbolic/neural computations have been established using exclusively
TIME and SPACE as classical resources (see, e.g., Thomas & Vollmer (2010);210
Sima & Orponen (2003)), and the tractability equivalence between paradigms
(see, e.g., van Rooij (2008)) mostly leaves out more precise investigations of
the remaining polynomial overhead. Against this background, the working hy-
potheses for the program are that TIME and SPACE are not always adequate
and sufficient as resources of analysis for elucidating all relevant properties of215
the respective paradigms, and that there are significant characteristics and ex-
planations to be found on a more fine-grained level than accessible by classical
methods of analysis (settling on the general tractability level).
The main line of research can be summarized in two consecutive questions
(corresponding to the stated working hypotheses), one starting out from a more220
subsymbolic, the other from a more symbolic perspective:
• Question 1: Especially when considering subsymbolic/neural forms of
computation and the associated dynamical systems conception, the ade-
quacy and exhaustiveness of the classical approaches to complexity anal-
ysis using only TIME and SPACE as resources for a fully informative225
characterization must be questioned. Are there more adequate resources
which should be taken into account for analysis?
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• Question 2: Especially when considering the symbolic level, are there
more adequate approaches/methods of analysis available than classical
complexity theory, allowing to take into account formalism- or calculus-230
specific characterizations of computations or to perform analyses at a more
fine-grained level than tractability?
Finally, in an integrative concluding step taking into account the methods
and findings resulting from the previous two, a third question shall be investi-
gated:235
• Question 3: Can the in principle results from Leitgeb (2005) be extended
to more specific and/or constructive correspondences between individual
notions and/or characterizations within the respective paradigms?
Answers to these questions (and the resulting refined tools and methods)
promise to contribute to resolving some of the basic theoretical and practical240
tensions described in Sect. 1 and 2: Although both paradigms are theoretically
undistinguishable (i.e., equivalent up to a polynomial overhead) in their gen-
eral computational-complexity behavior using classical methods of analysis and
characterization results, empirical studies and application cases using state of
the art approaches still show clear distinctions in suitability and feasibility of the245
respective paradigms for different types of tasks and domains without us having
an explanation for this behavior. Parts of this divergence might be explained by
previously unconsidered and unaccessible complexity-related properties of the
respective approaches and their connections to each other.
The targeted level of work is situated between the (purely theoretical) devel-250
opment of methods in complexity theory, network analysis, etc. and the (purely
applied) study of properties of computational and representational paradigms
by applying existing tools: Previous work from the different fields and lines of
research shall be assessed and combined—in doing so, where necessary, adapt-
ing or expanding the respective methods and tools—into new means of anal-255
ysis, which then shall subsequently be applied to suitably selected candidate
models representing paradigmatic examples of symbolic or subsymbolic rep-
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resentations/computations with respect to features relevant for the respective
question(s) at hand.
3.1. Proposed Program Structure and Approaches260
The envisioned research program is divided into three stages, corresponding
to the three initially posed questions. Each of the latter can (and should)
be addressed in its own right, but when taken together the respective answers
promise to also shed light on the bigger question for the existence and the precise
nature of foundational differences between the symbolic and the subsymbolic265
paradigm.
3.1.1. Adequate Resources for Analysis.
TIME and SPACE are the standard resources considered in classical com-
plexity analyses of computational frameworks. Correspondingly, most results
concerning complexity comparisons between symbolic and subsymbolic models270
of computation also focus on these two dimensions (as do, e.g., the aforemen-
tioned results in van Rooij (2008); van Emde Boas (1990)).
Still, the reading of TIME and SPACE as mostly relevant resources for com-
plexity analysis is closely connected to a Turing-style conception of computation
and a Von Neumann-inspired architecture as machine model, working, e.g., with275
limited memory. Especially when considering other computational paradigms
with different characteristics, as, e.g., the dynamical systems model commonly
associated to the subsymbolic/neural paradigm, the exhaustiveness and ade-
quateness of TIME and SPACE for a full analysis of all relevant computational
properties has to be questioned. Instead, it seems likely that additional re-280
sources specific to the respective model of computation and architecture have
to be taken into account in order to provide a complete characterization.
Thus, in a first stage of the program, popular network types on the sub-
symbolic/neural side shall be investigated for relevant dimensions of analysis
other than TIME and SPACE. Besides the classical standard and recurrent ap-285
proaches, of course also other models such as recurrent spiking neural networks
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(see, e.g. Gerstner et al. (2014)), Long Short-Term Memory networks and ex-
tensions thereof (see, e.g., Monner & Reggia (2012)), or recurrent stochastic
neural networks in form of Boltzmann machines (Ackley et al. (1985)) and re-
stricted Boltzmann machines (Hinton (2002)) could (and eventually will have290
to) be considered.
Taking recurrent networks of spiking neurons as examples, also measures
such as spike complexity (a bound for the total number of spikes during compu-
tation; Uchizawa et al. (2006)), convergence speed (from some initial network
state to the stationary distribution; Habenschuss et al. (2013)), sample com-295
plexity (the number of samples from the stationary distribution needed for a
satisfactory computational output; Vul et al. (2014)), or network size and con-
nectivity seem to be promising candidates for relevant dimensions of analysis.
These and similar proposals for the other network models shall be criti-
cally assessed and, where possible, put into a correspondence relation with each300
other, allowing to meaningfully generalize between different subsymbolic/neural
models and to provide general characterizations of the respective computations.
Having in mind the overall goal of connecting subsymbolic and symbolic ap-
proaches, a guiding heuristic for the selection of candidate proposals and also
during the final step of cross-model generalization is provided by the degree305
of expected cross-paradigmatic relevance: Taking examples from above, while
spike complexity—due to its direct correspondence to energy consumption dur-
ing computation—by itself seems to be an interesting and (especially biologi-
cally) highly relevant perspective for characterizing the resource-requirements
of computations in a recurrent spiking neural network, its relevance for char-310
acterizing the complexity of this type of ANN as compared to a corresponding
symbolic model might be limited due to the lack of a direct counterpart to the
concept of energy use in the logic-based framework. Convergence speed, on
the other hand, while (although less directly) still related as resource to en-
ergy consumption in the network setting, might allow for a more direct and315
adequate bridging to symbolic forms of computation, possibly corresponding to
concepts such as the required number of inference steps in the calculus of a
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certain logic-based formalism.
At the end of this stage, new proposals for adequate resources usable in
refined complexity analyses for subsymbolic/neural computation, together with320
application examples in terms of proof of concept analyses of popular paradigms,
will be available.
3.1.2. Adequate Methods of Analysis
In parallel to and/or following the search for more adequate resources for
complexity analyses of mostly subsymbolic/neural models of computation, in325
a second stage of the program emphasis shall be shifted towards the sym-
bolic/cognitive side. While staying closer to the classical conception of com-
plexity in terms of TIME and SPACE, recent developments in different fields of
theoretical computer science shall be combined into tools for more model-specific
and fine-grained analyses of computational properties.330
Parameterized-complexity theory (see, e.g., Downey & Fellows (1999)) makes
the investigation of problem-specific complexity characteristics possible, while
tools such as, e.g., developed in the theory of proof-complexity (see, e.g., Kraj´ıcek
(2005)) allow for more varied formalism- or calculus-specific characterizations of
the respective computations than currently done. Additionally, tools from de-335
scriptive complexity theory (see, e.g., Immerman (1999)) and work from model-
theoretic syntax (see, e.g., Rabin (1965)) seem likely to offer chances for shed-
ding light on complexity distinctions below the tractability threshold (i.e., for
exploring the precise nature of the polynomial overhead) and to allow for more
fine-grained and discriminative comparisons between paradigms and models.340
Thus, results from the just mentioned fields/techniques can be examined for
their applicability to better characterizing symbolic computation and to poten-
tially establishing conceptual connections to characterizations of subsymbolic
computation from the previous stage. Taking into account their specific prop-
erties and strengths, the corresponding tasks for the respective approaches can345
be summarized as follows:
• Parameterized-complexity theory: Taking into account problem- and application-
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specific properties of (families of) problems and connecting these to results
describing specific properties of subsymbolic or symbolic computation and
representation, try to explain the different suitability of one or the other350
paradigm for certain types of tasks.
• Descriptive complexity theory and model-theoretic syntax: Attempt to
explore complexity distinctions between different forms of symbolic and
between symbolic and subsymbolic computation also in more fine-grained
ways than by mere tractability considerations (e.g., also taking into ac-355
count the polynomial-time hierarchy and the logarithmic-time hierarchy).
• Proof-complexity theory: Explore formalism- and calculus-specific prop-
erties of symbolic computations and try to map these onto properties of
specific subsymbolic models.
Concerning a concrete implementation, one possibility is to initially apply360
methods and ideas from parameterized-complexity theory to existing and ac-
cepted computational complexity results concerning subsymbolic and symbolic
computation and representation in certain tasks and domains. Here, task- and
domain-specific properties of the respective paradigms shall be investigated also
beyond and below the level of classical tractability, attempting to elucidate parts365
of the reasons for the empirical differences between approaches.
In a first step, previous results from the literature can be taken and the pa-
rameterized dimension of analysis can be added, so that specificities of the task
or domain can be investigated while still maintaining the connection to previous
findings and the embedding in a more general scientific context. Subsequently,370
the overall approach of parameterized analysis can be combined with notions
taken from or inspired by the other aforementioned forms of (originally symbolic-
focused) fine-grained complexity analysis which allow to discriminate complex-
ity properties below the classical tractability threshold and on a formalism- and
calculus-specific level. The resulting combined approaches can then be applied375
to specific symbolic models selected based on hypotheses and correspondences
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obtained in the previous stage of the program (described in Sect. 3.1.1), as well
as on their suitability for the type of analysis under consideration.
At the end of this stage, proposals for refined methods of analysis especially
for forms of symbolic/cognitive computation and application examples in terms380
of proof of concept analyses, together with suggestions for correspondences to
models of subsymbolic/neural computation, will be available.
3.1.3. Correspondences Between Paradigms
In a third and final part of the program, by combining the results of the
preceding stages, additional dimensions can be added to previous analyses and385
established equivalence results, and the precise nature of the polynomial over-
head as computational difference between paradigms can better be explained.
Also, the outcomes of previous stages shall be integrated where meaningfully
possible, ideally providing the foundations for a general set of refined means
of analysis for future comparative investigations of symbolic/cognitive and sub-390
symbolic/neural computation.
Depending on previous outcomes, some of the following (interrelated) ques-
tions are expected to be addressable:
• Given the in principle equivalence between (symbolic) non-monotonic log-
ical systems and (subsymbolic) dynamical systems, is it possible to estab-395
lish complexity-based systematic conceptual relationships between partic-
ular logical calculi and different types of subsymbolic networks?
If such relationships can indeed be identified, this will be informative in
at leas two ways: On a functional level, given that certain subsymbolic or
symbolic approaches are known to perform well on specific tasks, knowl-400
edge about correspondences between paradigms can narrow down the
range of candidates for solving the same tasks using methods from the re-
spective other paradigm. On a structural level, the envisioned conceptual
relationships promise additional ways of comparing the respective struc-
ture of the conceptual spaces of subsymbolic and symbolic approaches—405
16
while their internal organization (e.g., concerning gradual differences in ex-
pressivity or computational properties between different logics, or learning
capacity or computational complexity between different types of ANNs)
by now has been mapped out fairly well, establishing correspondences
and transferring known structural orderings from the respectively better-410
known space to the other still poses major challenges.
• Can adaptations in network structure and/or (the artificial equivalent of)
synaptic dynamics (see, e.g., Choquet & Triller (2013)) in a neural rep-
resentation in a systematic way be related to re-representation in a logic-
based representation, or (alternatively) is there a systematic correspon-415
dence on the level of change of calculus? Can changes in network type
in a neural representation in a systematic way be related to changes of
non-monotonic logic in a symbolic representation?
As dynamic adaptations of network topology, connection properties and/or
synaptic properties can be taken as hallmarks of the functioning of the420
human brain and, to a large extent, also of many successful ANN mod-
els, finding or creating corresponding mechanisms for symbolic approaches
would promise to also allow for a transfer of functional properties from the
subsymbolic to the symbolic paradigm, for instance, with regard to appli-
cations in learning and generalization. On the other hand, by observing425
the corresponding changes on the symbolic level a better understanding
and explanation of the actual functioning and mechanisms at work in the
subsymbolic case can be expected. Similar expectations can be main-
tained on the less biologically-motivated, but from a computer science
perspective currently possibly even more relevant level of network types430
and different logics.
• Can the correspondences and differences between novel network models
approximating classical symbolic capacities (as, e.g., top-down control) or
architectures (as, e.g., a Von Neumann machine) and the original symbolic
concepts be characterized in a systematic way?435
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While several promising network models offering partial interpretations in
symbolic terms have recently been proposed (see Sect. 2.2), this far the
correspondences between the new model and the classical notions have
mostly been established on a case-by-case basis and no targeted develop-
ment aiming at methodically developing the newly introduced approaches440
further towards fully covering the classical conceptualizations have been
presented. Here, systematic correspondences could offer guidance for the
corresponding process.
At the end of this stage, partial answers to some of the stated questions to-
gether with proposals for future lines of investigation continuing the work started445
in the program will be available. Also, suggestions for new tools and methods for
the comparative analysis of symbolic/cognitive and subsymbolic/neural compu-
tation will be made.
3.2. Expected Outcomes
If implemented successfully, the sketched research program is expected to be450
highly beneficial for neural-symbolic integration on at least two dimensions, a
methodological and a theoretical one.
From the methodological point of view, new general approaches and up-
dated and refined formal tools for better and more adequately analyzing and
characterizing the nature and mechanisms of representation and computation in455
the corresponding paradigm(s) will be developed: Alternative resources comple-
menting TIME and SPACE for the characterization of properties of (especially
subsymbolic/neural) computation will be provided, and emphasis will be put
on making model-specific properties of the respective computing mechanisms
accessible. Also, alternative methods complementing the classical complexity-460
theoretical approach to the characterization of properties of (especially sym-
bolic/cognitive) computation will be explored and canonized. Here, the focus
will be on opening up formalism- or calculus-specific properties of the respec-
tive computing mechanisms, and on offering more fine-grained insights than
available in the classical framework.465
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From the theoretical point of view, new perspectives on the relation be-
tween symbolic/cognitive and subsymbolic/neural representation and computa-
tion will be explored and a better understanding of the respective approach(es)
and their interaction (with a strong orientation towards a future integration of
conceptual paradigms, of levels of explanation, and of involved scientific dis-470
ciplines) shall be established. Emphasis will be put on understanding the in-
teraction between model-specific changes in one paradigm and corresponding
adaptations of the respective conceptual or formal counterpart within the other
paradigm.
4. Anchoring Knowledge in Interaction in a Framework and Archi-475
tecture of Computational Cognition
The research program proposed in the previous section aims at uncovering
basic distinctions and connections between subsymbolic and symbolic computa-
tion and representation on a—although strongly empirically motivated—mostly
theoretical level. Complementing and completing this approach, in the follow-480
ing (building on parts of a larger proposal originally presented in Besold et al.
(2015)) a second research endeavor is outlined, aiming at integrating neural-
level and cognitive-level approaches in a new perspective and cognitive system
architecture for interaction-grounded knowledge acquisition and processing in
a closed acting/sensing–processing–reasoning cycle. In addition to the question485
of neural-symbolic integration it, thus, also is of direct relevance for practical
challenges such as representational re-description and the progressive acquisi-
tion of abstract representations from raw sensory inputs in robot architectures
(Guerin et al. (2013)).
4.1. An Agent’s Knowledge for/in/from Its World490
Natural agents in many situations in their reasoning seem to rely on an
enormous richness of representations (multimodal, grounded, embodied and sit-
uated), with many layers of representation at different levels of abstraction, to-
gether with dynamic re-organization of knowledge. Also, real-world situations
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require agents to perform what can be interpreted as dynamic changes or align-495
ments of representation, as different agents might use different languages and
levels of description. Unfortunately, when trying to follow the natural example
by transferring and (re-)creating this representational richness and diversity in
artificial agents, the resulting mismatches cannot be cured by standardization,
but arise due to differences in the environment, tasks to be solved, levels of500
abstraction, etc. Additionally, real-world applications also demand online and
bidirectional learning that takes place in real-time, as well as the adaptation to
changes in the environment, to the presence of new agents, and to task changes.
In order to be able to face these challenges, we envision a system operating
on different levels of representations (corresponding to different formal layers505
in the system’s architecture). The hierarchy could consist, for instance, of a
(lowest) neural layer learning on the perception/motor level, an anchoring layer
learning elementary (semi-)symbolic representations of objects, a reactive layer
taking over in critical situations, a deep learning layer learning on more abstract
levels, a symbolic layer doing reasoning and planning, and a (higher) symbolic510
layer providing the core ontology. Some of these layers have obvious, some
have partial, some have fuzzy, and some have no mappings/relations between
themselves.
Now, a corresponding architecture should be in a “pre-established harmony”
with initial correspondences between and across levels: Triggering an abstract515
plan to move from A to B should result in the motor action to move from A to B,
classifying on the neural level a certain perceptual input such as, for instance, a
chair should result in the activation of the concept “chair” in the ontology or the
working memory, and so on. And whilst the basic links might be hard coded,
learning a new concept on the subsymbolic level should somehow result in a520
new concept entry in the ontology, i.e., there should be interaction between the
different layers in terms of information and conceptualizations. Finally, when
thinking about a simulated or actual system that is operating on these interact-
ing levels in a multi-representational manner it should allow for the learning or
detection of obvious mappings between the layers, for detecting novelties and525
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correlations, for systematically unfolding the specific properties of structures on
different levels, or for finding invariant properties of the interactions between
levels.
4.2. From Interaction to Knowledge and Back
Against this background, in Besold et al. (2015) a program has been proposed530
for ’anchoring knowledge in interaction’, aiming at developing, theoretically and
practically, a conceptual framework and corresponding architecture that model
an agent’s knowledge, thinking, and acting truly as interrelated parts of a unified
cognitive capacity. That is, knowledge is seen as multi-layered phenomenon
that appears at different levels of abstraction, promotes interaction between535
these levels of abstraction, is influenced by the interaction between agent and
environment (potentially including other agents), and is essentially linked to
actions, perception, thinking, and being. Thus, the future architecture aims
to anchor and embody knowledge by the interaction between the agent and its
environment (possibly including other agents), to give an approach to lift the540
resulting situated action patterns to a symbolic level, to reason by analogy on
the abstract and the subsymbolic level, to adapt, or in case of clashes, repair
the initial representations in order to fit to new situations, and to evaluate the
approach in concrete settings providing feedback to the system in a reactive-
adaptive evolutionary cycle. Among others, this will require a new paradigm545
for neural-symbolic knowledge repositories featuring different integrated levels
and forms of knowledge representation (as, e.g., multi-modal or hybrid).
On an embodied level, elementary forms of representations shall be learned
from an agent’s interactions within an environment. As the resulting multi-
modal representations are likely to be noisy, uncertain, vague, unstable over550
time, and represented in different languages in different agents, an extension of
the anchoring framework in robotics Coradeschi & Saffiotti (2000) to grounding
not only objects, but also certain general observable properties appearing in the
environment, will be needed.
Once an interaction-based neural representation of knowledge has been ob-555
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tained, neural systems can promote robust learning from data, as part of an
online learning and reasoning cycle. On this level, a lifting procedure shall be
specified that will produce descriptions, thus lifting grounded situations and
an agent’s action patterns to a more abstract (symbolic) representation. This
can be done using techniques from machine learning such as, e.g., deep neural560
networks (as mentioned in Sect. 2.2) and analogy-making across networks (i.e.,
representation systems) and learning processes (i.e., procedural approaches) as
proposed in d’Avila Garcez et al. (2015).
Although one could consider the neural-symbolic part already as solved with
the “syntactic” lifting of neural representations to symbol-based ones, the en-565
visioned research program targets an additional “semantic” step: As already
mentioned, initial multi-modal representations lifted from the subsymbolic level
can be error-prone and are likely to be represented in different and possibly
at first incompatible representation languages between different agents. In or-
der to also close these contentual gaps within and between agents, a dynamic570
re-organization and alignment (based on ontology repair mechanisms, analogy,
concept invention, and knowledge transfer) is foreseen. These mechanisms foster
adaptation of an agent to new situations, the alignment between representations
of different agents, the reformulation of knowledge entries, and the generation
of new knowledge.575
In summary, the envisioned account of the emergence of representations
through cognitive principles in an agent (or multi-agent) setting can be concep-
tualized as follows: Grounding knowledge in cognitively plausible multimodal
interaction paradigms; lifting grounded situations into more abstract represen-
tations; reasoning by analogy and concept blending at more abstract levels;580
repair and re-organization of initial and generated abstract representations.
4.3. Proposed Program Structure and Approaches
The proposed approach requires the integration of expressive symbolic knowl-
edge representation formalisms, relational knowledge, variables, and first-order
logic on the one hand with representations of sensorimotor experiences, action585
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patterns, connectionist representations, and multi-modal representations on the
other—basically exhausting the entire spectrum of levels of representation con-
sidered in neural-symbolic integration.
With respect to the formalization, research methods from machine learning
(e.g. cross-validation as described by Dietterich (1998) or Arnold et al. (2010)’s590
layer-wise model selection in deep neural networks) will be applied to learn con-
ceptual knowledge from subsymbolic data. The resulting conceptual knowledge
will be provided as input to the analogy-making process to generate new con-
cepts by abstraction and transfer of knowledge in a domain-independent and
multi-modal setting. As this might potentially change the signatures of the595
underlying representation language(s), the theory of institutions (Diaconescu
(2008)) will be used in order to model the corresponding dynamic changes of
languages. Finally, the repair of theories and the concept invention mechanisms
will be linked to analogy-making and are situated on the level of higher-order
logic (Bundy (2013); Lehmann et al. (2013)).600
From the perspective of neural-symbolic integration, the envisioned research
program can be subdivided into three main modules:
• Cognitive Foundations of Knowledge and Anchoring: Approaches from
computational neuroscience and network-level cognitive modeling (as, e.g.,
the recently proposed framework of conceptors in dynamical system mod-605
els; Jaeger (2014)), together with theoretical considerations on sensorimo-
tor interactions as part of knowledge formation (Fischer (2012)), serve as
basis for the creation of low-level input representations and content for
the subsequent stages of processing and reasoning. These inputs are then
used in an anchoring step (Coradeschi & Saffiotti (2000)) grounding sym-610
bols referring to perceived physical objects in the agent’s environment.
Compared to previous approaches (Chella et al. (2003)), in the present
context anchoring shall be developed further and conducted under even
more general conditions: If the proposed program is implemented suc-
cessfully, among others, anchoring will happen top-down and bottom-up615
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during learning, and new symbols for new objects and categories are dy-
namically introduced by repair and concept invention mechanisms.
Although at first sight lying outside the core domain of neural-symbolic
integration, an effective solution to the anchoring problem in the just
described form seems nonetheless indispensable. A fully integrated neural-620
symbolic cognitive system should bridge from direct sensory inputs to
high-level symbolic representations and vice versa, with the equivalence
between representations not only residing on a syntactic but also on a
semantic and computational level—the latter of which require the capacity
to reason about perceptual input also on lower representation levels in625
conceptual terms.
• Lifting Knowledge from the Subsymbolic to the Symbolic Level: Deep
learning as a form of representation learning that aims at discovering mul-
tiple levels of representation has shown promising results when applied to
real-time processing of multimodal data (De Penning et al. (2011)), and630
state-of-the-art deep learning methods and algorithms have been able to
train deep networks effectively when applied to different kinds of networks,
knowledge fusion, and transfer learning (Bengio (2009)). However, more
expressive descriptions and forms of representation have become more dif-
ficult to obtain from neural networks.635
This module constitutes the centerpiece from the perspective of neural-
symbolic integration. In it, neural learning shall be combined with tem-
poral knowledge representation in stochastic networks, for instance by
using variations of the Restricted Boltzmann Machine model (Hinton
(2012)). The resulting approach then will offer a method for validating hy-640
potheses through the symbolic description of the trained networks whilst
robustly dealing with uncertainty and errors through a Bayesian infer-
ence model. Furthermore, using the “conceptual spaces” from Ga¨rdenfors
(2000) (building and expanding upon work presented, e.g., in LeBlanc &
Saffiotti (2008)), symbolic and subsymbolic data shall be linked in the645
24
proposed complex loop of sensing, processing, and reasoning.
• Analogy/Blending and Concept Formation/Reformation: While the first
module on cognitive foundations of knowledge and anchoring shall pro-
vide the basis on which the lifting process can operate, the envisioned
framework is completed by a third module framing and supporting the650
lifting process on an upper representational level. In this part of the
program, analogy-making and concept (re)formation shall be added to
the acting/sensing–processing–reasoning cycle in order to model high-level
knowledge processing and to provide feedback and partial guidance to the
knowledge acquisition and interpretation processes on lower levels.655
Analogy is classically understood as a method to detect and operate on
structural commonalities between two domains (Gentner et al. (2001)),
and due to its central role in human cognition over the years a signifi-
cant number of computational models of analogy-making have been de-
veloped in AI (Besold (2011)). The targeted approach in the sketched660
program advances beyond the current state of the art in that general-
izability, multi-modal representations, and the grounding in the agent’s
interaction with the environment are considered to be essential features.
Additionally, analogy-making shall not only happen on the (symbolic)
knowledge level, but already before that during learning and knowledge665
lifting, leading to cross-informing learning processes between similar sen-
sory settings. Furthermore, analogies shall directly be linked to knowledge
repair and knowledge formation mechanisms in order to facilitate the res-
olution of errors appearing almost unavoidably as part of the described
paradigm: An important way in which new concepts are formed is through670
the (analogy-based) combination of existing concepts into a new concept
by a blending mechanism (Fauconnier & Turner (2002)), or by the evolu-
tion of existing concepts that have proved inadequate. Inadequacies of the
latter type are often revealed by failures of inference using the old con-
cepts. Here, based on the reformation algorithm (Bundy (2013)), generic675
25
mechanisms for repairing agents’ faulty representations (especially those
produced by imperfect analogies) will be developed.
When taken together, solving all three modules allows for a completely inte-
grated neural-symbolic architecture, bridging not only on a syntactic level from
connectionist to symbolic representations, but also taking into account semantic680
structures on all levels, from regularities and governing rules in the perceived en-
vironment of an agent (accessed via computations on the sensory input stream),
through commonalities on an intermediate procedural level, to similarity struc-
tures and concept (re)formation on abstract knowledge entries. In doing so, the
sketched cognitive computational framework will come closer to its biological in-685
spiration, the human brain and mind, in functional and (abstracted) structural
terms than previous architectures, serving as a proof of concept for the power
and as test bench for the limitations of many currently popular theories and
approaches. As such, it will not only serve as a step towards the (re-)creation of
intelligence with computational means, but potentially will on a meta-level also690
allow to assess the suitability of current attempts at reaching this long-standing
goal.
4.4. First Steps Towards an Implementation
A basic conceptual architecture for the envisioned computational framework
can be sketched as presented in Fig. 2. In accordance with the program struc-695
ture presented in the previous section, from a neural-symbolic perspective it
consists of three main functional components with the lifting of knowledge from
the subsymbolic to the symbolic level as centerpiece mediating between low-level
embodied sensing and anchoring and high-level concept formation and process-
ing.700
Interaction happens both between layers within individual modules (as, e.g.,
between the cognitive foundations and the anchoring) as well as across compo-
nents (as, e.g., through the feedback from the concept formation/reformation
to the anchoring). This results in a tightly interconnected architecture forming
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Figure 2: A schematic overview of structure and internal knowledge dynamics of the envi-
sioned architecture featuring a closed neural-symbolic cycle of learning and reasoning (adapted
from Besold et al. (2015)). While all three modules are relevant for closing the subsym-
bolic/symbolic cycle, the central functional component of knowledge lifting corresponds to
the classical core part of neural-symbolic integration. In addition to the depicted knowledge
dynamics from the level of an agent’s embodied sensing and acting to conceptual theories (and
back), interactions between the modules and sub-components also happen on other levels: For
instance analogy-making also shall operate on the level of mechanisms during learning and
knowledge lifting (see Sect. 4.3).
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a dynamic whole, with changes in one layer propagating to others in order to705
re-establish the “harmony” introduced in Sect. 4.1.
Within the low-level subsymbolic module, the aforementioned conceptors
(Jaeger (2014)), deep neural networks (Lee et al. (2009)), and similar approaches
are employed in order to initially pre-structure the perceptual input stream on
a subsymbolic level, augmenting the proto-structure resulting from the proper-710
ties and modalities of the embodied setting. This structure can then serve as
foothold for the anchoring process in a perception-based coupling of structural
to environmental elements and/or to action-based percepts of the agent (also
taking into account the property and attribute levels of objects/entities). Thus,
while staying within the subsymbolic realm, more abstract correspondences be-715
tween structured parts of the perceptual input stream and the corresponding
represented content are established. These vehicle-content pairs then can be ar-
ranged in a hierarchical structure on the level of different objects/entities, but
also more fine-grainedly on the level of object/entity-specific properties.
Within the high-level symbolic module, analogy and analogy-based blending720
are used to structure the permanently changing overall knowledge base of the
agent, to transfer and adapt knowledge between similar contexts, and to create
new high-level concepts through the blending of concepts in the knowledge base.
These processes potentially reveal existing or introduce new inconsistencies be-
tween concepts, which can then be addressed by the top-level concept formation725
and reformation layer. In this highest layer, inconsistencies are fixed through
manipulations of the symbolic representational structure, in turn possibly intro-
ducing new representations or concepts by altering the represented knowledge
elements or the overall representation language. In order to maintain the in-
ternal structure of the overall framework, the top layer therefore might have730
to feed back changes or additions to the subsymbolic anchoring layer which
then is forced to perform the corresponding adaptations in its assignment of
objects/entities to representations.
Finally, the neural-symbolic core module in the center of the architecture
bridging from low-level to high-level representations and processing builds upon735
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the output of the anchoring layer, i.e., correspondences between objects/entities
in the perceived environment and structural elements of the subsymbolic repre-
sentation, and uses deep learning techniques for representation learning in order
to convert (and, by doing so, lift) the subsymbolic content-loaden representa-
tions to logic-based expressions. The corresponding learning process taps into740
pre-existing knowledge on the symbolic side based on the analogy mechanism
and the assumption that relative temporal continuity of the environment (and,
thus, the agent’s input stream) should result in newly lifted symbolic concepts
sharing analogical commonalities with already existing ones, which then in turn
can be exploited to support the lifting process. Additionally, using the same745
assumption of only gradual change in the environment successive or parallel
lifting processes can be implemented in a cross-informing manner, establishing
analogical similarities not only over knowledge items (i.e., procedural objects)
but also over the processes themselves and exploiting the expected appearance
of similar sub-parts of the corresponding mechanisms.750
5. Integrating Both Programs: Why the Whole Is More than the
Sum of the Parts
While being at first sight almost orthogonal in approach and nature of ques-
tions (formal and theoretical on the one side, engineering-focused and systems-
oriented on the other), both research programs share deep connections, have to755
be regarded as complementary and cross-informing, and promise to mutually
augment each other in results and impact not only, but also with respect to the
‘four pillars of BICA’ (Stocco et al. (2010)).
The program on complexity differences and connections between different
subsymbolic and symbolic formalisms for computation and representation can760
shed light on aspects of crucial importance for a systems-oriented program as
the ‘anchoring knowledge in interaction’ cognitive architecture. Results from the
former program can help in selecting suitable approaches within the different
layers and modules of the envisioned cognitive framework assuring the feasibility
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of operating the resulting implemented system. The more engineering-focused765
perspective of the second proposed program on the other hand provides incentive
to pursue a more constructive approach to the questions asked in the theoretical
research program, instead of limiting the focus to existential results. Also,
the cognitive architecture offers a natural use case and empirical testbed for
the expected outcomes of the complexity-oriented research endeavor, by this770
completing the cross-informing feedback loop between both programs.
With respect to the mentioned core lines of research on Biologically-Inspired
Cognitive Architectures (i.e., the bottom-up reverse engineering of the brain, the
human-like aspects of artificial intelligence, the integration of data and models,
and the development of a computational architecture), the aggregate of results775
from both programs promises to advance significantly beyond the state of the
art. As already described in Sect. 1, bridging between subsymbolic/neural and
symbolic/cognitive approaches to representation and computation promises to
answer several long-standing questions in the relevant fields and to establish
explanatory bridges between the different perspectives on the human brain and780
its capacities. In doing so, especially through the second program and its agent-
based embodied approach, a more human-like style of interacting in and, subse-
quently, learning from the environment can be expected, presumably resulting
in conceptualizations and knowledge structures which are closer to human pro-
cessing than current computational accounts. By closing the gap between neural785
representations and logic-based models the mass of data collected in the neu-
rosciences is made accessible to use in computational-level models developed
by cognitive psychologists and AI researchers, allowing for the validation or
refutation of existing and the development of new hypotheses about human
cognition and intelligence, while in the opposite direction also allowing for the790
more targeted and purpose-specific collection of new data. Finally, the second
program specifically aims at delivering a cognitive architecture implementing
a closed subsymbolic/symbolic acting/sensing–processing–reasoning cycle, par-
tially building on results from the first program and pushing far beyond the
state of the art in current cognitive architectures in several respects.795
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6. The Immediate Vision: Preparing the Ground for Really Smart
Systems in the 21st Century
On the long run, integrating symbolic/cognitive and subsymbolic/neural
paradigms of computation and representation is expected to solve foundational
questions within AI/computer science and cognitive and computational neuro-800
science (as discussed in Sect. 1 and 5), at the same time bringing these fields
closer to each other and establishing deeper rooted connections beyond today’s
level of metaphorical similarities and inspirational links between models and con-
ceptions. At the same time, as already mentioned at the beginning of Sect. 4,
successful neural-symbolic integration also promises to solve crucial challenges805
in neighboring fields such as representational re-description and the progressive
acquisition of abstract representations from raw sensory inputs in robot archi-
tectures (Guerin et al. (2013)). There, by endowing robots with the ability to
explore different ways of storing and manipulating information across the entire
spectrum of subsymbolic and symbolic approaches, it shall become possible to810
use multiple problem solving strategies from low-level systematic search to ab-
stract reasoning (Evans (2003)). Still, significant and lasting impact also on a
shorter timescale can be expected in another domain of study and technological
development, namely in the area of smart systems.
Following the advent of the internet/WWW, ubiquitous computing (Poslad815
(2009)) and ambient intelligence systems (Aarts & Wichert (2009)) mostly per-
forming high-level and complex reasoning based on low-level data and signals
will be key to the future development of advanced intelligent applications and
smart environments. Whilst accumulating large sets of data and subsequent (of-
ten statistical) reasoning can provide for current applications Cook et al. (2009),820
many real-world scenarios in the near future will require reliable reasoning also
based on smaller samples of data, either due to the need for immediate (re)action
without the time delay or effort required for obtaining additional usable data,
or due to the need of dealing with rare events offering too few similar data
entries as to allow for the application of standard learning- or statistics-driven825
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approaches. If a bridge between the subsymbolic sensor data and high-level
symbolic representations can be established, then knowledge- and rule-based
approaches promise to mitigate the just described problems. Pre-coded sym-
bolic background information and rule-based semantic processing can deal with
foreseeable types of rare events, and logic-based representations of occurrences830
which cannot be accounted for offer the possibility to search for different, but
sufficiently similar data points across different knowledge sources possibly aug-
menting the data set available for the low-level approaches. The correspond-
ing systems will, thus, have to make use of subsymbolic processing side by
side with complex abstract reasoning mechanisms, which then will have to be835
used to inform subsequent low-level sensing and processing steps in an action-
oriented continuous acting/sensing–processing–reasoning cycle (similar to the
cognitive system envisioned as outcome of the corresponding research program
from Sect. 4).
A concrete application scenario could, e.g., be envisioned in the domain of840
AAL. While current systems mostly have to rely on statistical approaches and
continuously growing amounts of sensor data in monitoring and interpreting the
users behavior in order to operate appropriately, processing the available sensor
information on all levels of the neural-symbolic hierarchy in parallel promises
not only incremental progress but qualitatively new functionalities. On the one845
hand (mostly symbolic) semantic information could be taken into account in
interpreting the observed user behavior and environment also in highly uncom-
mon situations, allowing for previously unachieved forms of interaction: Tak-
ing an example from AAL in a care context, imagine a situation in which a
cognitively-impaired person misinterprets an apple-shaped candle as an actual850
fruit and attempts to bite into the candle. While this constitutes a very rarely
occurring setup, if the system is able to assess the high-level ontological infor-
mation that, although apple-shaped, a candle does not fall into the category
of eatable objects or food items this enables an intervention from the system
preventing the user to proceed with the intended action. Still, full integration855
from the level of biologically-adequate brain models and simulations to abstract
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reasoning and semantic processing (and back) in the mid-term should make
even more advanced systems possible. Taking models and simulations of human
perception processes and corresponding brain computations on the neural level
(as, e.g., a version of Jirsa et al. (2010)’s Virtual Brain additionally equipped to860
also allow for external input) and making them accessible and interpretable to a
smart system will eventually enable the latter to “see through the user’s eyes”,
paving the way for a qualitatively new generation of user models. Equipped
with a sufficiently accurate account of the user’s (low-level) perception-based
reading of the environment, subsequent biologically-inspired neural-level com-865
putations, and corresponding (high-level) interpretations, a smart system could
predict when automatically induced ambient changes (such as, e.g., switching
on a light source) will help clarify potential perception-based ambiguities or
generally facilitate and enhance the user’s perception and, thus, interactions.
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